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Abstract-A Zperson zero-sum game with the payoff function being a sum of two linear functions 
and a bilinear one is considered on a generally unbounded polyhedral set, which is interpreted as a 
set of pairs of strategies of two players, where the strategies turn out to be connected. The problem 
of existence and finding a certain equilibrium point of the game along with that of min-max and 
max-min points for the payoff function is examined. Verifiable necessary and sufhcient conditions 
for solutions to these problems are proposed. These conditions make it pcesible to find the points 
by solving an auxiliary system of linear and quadratic constraints (for the equilibrium points), and 
quadratic programming problems (for the min-max and msx-min points) formed on the basis of the 
master problems. 
Keywords-z-person game, Equilibrium points, Max-min and min-max points, Saddle points, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We examine the function cp(s, y) = (p, z) + (2, Dy) + (q, y) on the polyhedral set S = ((2, y) : 
z E R”,, y E RI;, AZ + By 2 d}, where p, q, d and A, B, D are, respectively, vectors and 
matrices of corresponding dimensions, whose elements are real numbers. This function can be 
interpreted as a payoff function in a Zperson zero-sum game, where the players’ strategies form 
pairs (z, y) E S and are connected. For such a game, we establish verifiable necessary and 
sufficient conditions for its equilibrium points that make it possible to reduce calculating the 
points to solving an auxiliary system of linear and quadratic constraints. For S = { (2, y) : z E 
RT, y E RT, AZ + By = d), it becomes possible to reduce calculating the points to solving some 
auxiliary quadratic programming problems, and possibly, quadratic equations. 
Along with the above game, we consider two, two-move games in which one of the players 
makes its move first and the other has all the information on the outcome of this move, where, 
respectively, minz max, cp(z, y) and max, min, cp(z, y) are to be found for (z, y) E S. A particular 
kind of the latter problem for the function f(s, y) = (p, z) + (q, y) on a bounded S was considered 
The below results generalize those presented at 15 th International Symposium on Mathematical Programming, 
Ann Arbor, MI, U.S.A., August 15-19, 1994, and were partly obtained by the author in 1993-1994, when he was 
working at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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by Falk in [l], where a finite solution method was proposed. The method is, in fact, a branch and 
bound one, where auxiliary linear programming problems are solved to obtain the upper bounds. 
In this article, a different approach to solving the above mentioned two-move games, in a more 
general case, (where D $ 0 and S can be unbounded) is proposed. The approach does not 
involve the branch and bound philosophy, and is based on necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the problems solutions established in the article. These conditions are verifiable, and make 
it possible to reduce calculating an optimal strategy of the player which makes its move first to 
solving an auxiliary quadratic programming problem. Such a reduction is done in a similar way, it 
is exercised for the problem of finding an equilibrium point of the basic game under consideration. 
2. THE PROBLEMS STATEMENT AND 
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
We first consider a problem that can serve as a model for some practical situations and leads 
to the games under study in this article. 
A company (seller) manufactures n kinds of commodities in some locations being under taxa- 
tion and has a stable demand (according to the signed contracts) for the commodities from the 
traditional customers for a certain period of time (period of planning). Such arrangements leave, 
however, the manufacturing facilities underused. Trying to find the new customers that might 
be interested in buying additional volumes of the commodities (that could be manufactured in 
the facilities), the seller negotiates a contract with a new potential customer (buyer) who rep- 
resents m geographic points, where the total demand for each of the commodities exceeds the 
available (underused) part of the seller’s capacities to manufacture the commodity to be sold to 
the buyer. In order to meet the buyer’s demand, the seller plans to set up additional manufac- 
turing of the commodities in a certain free zone, assuming to invest there a part of the profit 
to be raised from selling to the buyer the commodities manufactured in the existing facilities in 
volumes that do not exceed the differences between the capacities of the facilities and the volumes 
that are sold to the traditional customers. 
Based on market prices for the commodities and expenditure for the commodities manufactur- 
ing and storing, the seller wants to determine what volume of each commodity to manufacture 
in the free zone in order to maximize (for instance) revenue of the commodities selling, while the 
buyer negotiates the prices with the seller trying to minimize the cost of the deal, taking into 
account existing taxes in the locations. 
For the sake of definiteness, it is further assumed, that selling of the commodities from the 
locations and the free zone to the points is done under CIF conditions. All the transportation 
tariffs are assumed constant for the period of planning that takes place, for instance, if the 
transportation is done by maritime lines (so-called line tariffs). According to the contract being 
negotiated, the buyer must buy the commodities manufactured by the seller in the locations in 
some stipulated volumes. However, the buyer cannot meet the demand for each commodity in 
the points buying the commodities (manufactured by the seller) either just from the locations 
or just from the free zone, whereas the seller has no reasons to relocate all its manufacturing 
facilities to the free zone or to increase capacities of the existing facilities in the locations. 
Let 
“j 
Yij 
Gj 
aijx 
- 
be the CIF price offered by the buyer for a unit of commodity j, j E 1, n; 
be the volume of commodity j that is to be sold in the free zone and delivered to point i, 
iEl,,jEl, 
be the tariff for transportation of a unit of commodity j from the free zone to point i, 
iEl,, jEl, 
be the stipulated volume of commodity j that is to be delivered from location X to point i, 
iEl,,jEl,n,XE1, 
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be the tariff for transportation of a unit of commodity j from location X to point i, i E Gm, 
jEl,,XE1,, 
be expenditure for the delivery insurance of a unit of commodity j from location X to 
point i, i E l,m, j E 1,71, X E 1,c1; 
be expenditure for the delivery insurance of a unit of commodity j from the free zone to 
point i, i E l,m, j E 1, 
be the existing demand for commodity j in point i, i E Gm, j E 5; 
be the expenditure for manufacturing and storing a unit of commodity j in the free zone; 
be percent of the price zj that is paid as a tax when buying a unit of commodity j in 
location X, j E Ir, X E G 
be percent of the total expenditure in the locations to be paid as the taxes that is reason- 
able not to exceed for the buyer; 
be percent of the profit to be invested in the activities related to the contract with the 
buyer; 
be miscellaneous expenditures related to setting up manufacturing and storing activity in 
the free zone, manufacturing the stipulated volumes of the commodities in the locations 
that are to be sold to the buyer, the commodities delivery to the points, etc. 
following relations hold: 
5 5 Xj 2 3Zjj, jEl,; (1) 
A ~~~e~j*zj-~~~ %Jx .. ( .. %JX+eijX) 2 2 2 Yij (qj+<ij+Aj)+r; (2) 
X=1 i=l j=l X=1 i=l j=l kl j=l 
P 
c aijx + Yij 2 oij, iEl,77I, jEl,n; (3) 
x=1 
m m 
c Yij 5 Wj c oijc 0 < Wj < 1, j E 1, n; (4) 
(1 -&)C C Caijxkjhxj I&C C Caijxxj. 
X=1 i=l j=l X=1 i=l j=l 
(5) 
Here, (1) reflects competitiveness of the prices offered by the buyer, (2) secures coverage of the 
seller’s expenditures related to the bargain by the investment, (3) secures the demand satisfaction 
for the commodities in the points, (4) secures necessity for the buyer to buy the commodities not 
only in the free zone, (5) secures acceptable ratio between the money to be spend by the buyer 
for the commodities acquisition (including the taxes) in the locations and delivery from them, 
and for the taxes. 
The behavior of both participants of the bargain is, in fact, that of the two players (the seller 
and the buyer) in a a-person game, where the players’ strategies are connected so that their pairs 
belong to the polyhedral set given by relations (l)-(5). One can consider a number of payoff 
functions that reflect the goals of the participants. For example, 
cpl (Xl, * * * 7%; Yll, - + + 7Ymn) = 2 2 2 aijAXj + 2 2 YijXj7 
Xrl is1 j-1 i=l j=l 
describes the sum to be paid to the seller by the buyer for the commodities acquisition and 
delivery, 
fi m n m n m n 
VI2 (Xl,. * * I % Yll, . . . ,&h8) = C C C aijxxj + C C YijXj - C C Yijtij, 
X11 i=l j=l is1 j=l i=l j=l 
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describes the same as cpl(zr, . . . , z,; 911,. . . , ymn), if for any reasons, the transportation from the 
free zone to the points is provided by the buyer. (Such a situation may occur, for example, when 
the buyer either runs or can arrange the transportation at the best prices in the transportation 
market available to the seller. This kind of the buyer’s capability may affect the seller in choosing 
a geographic location to be the free zone and is, usually, a part of the bargain reflecting the buyer’s 
interest in dealing with the particular seller in order to secure economic development of a certain 
region using the free zone financial advantages.) 
Denoting y = (yrr, . . . , gmn) and z = (~1,. . . , zn), one can rewrite (l)-(5) in a vector-matrix 
form 
Az+By>d, 
whered= (dr,...,dl), and A, B are matrices whose nonzero elements are easily calculated from 
ajjx, qj, lEjx, A, E, <ij, ,Oij, or are equal to 1 or -1, whereas elements of d are calculated from 
5, ~j, 7, gij, aijx, VijA, A, $ijx, wj or equal zero. SO, the problem of finding optimal strategies 
of the buyer and the seller in the game with the payoff function 
cpzb, Y) = (P9 4 + (G DY) - (E9 YL 
where 6 = (01,. . . ,&A, P = (PI,. . . , 
- 
pn), pj = Cb, CL1 oijx, j = l,n, and D is n x mn 
matrix that is formed by m copies of the unit matrix E of order n, i.e., 
can in fact, be considered as one for the players in a P-person zero-sum game on S = ((2, y) 2 
0 : Az + By 2 d} with the payoff function (p, z) + (2, Dy) + (f, y), where t E -t E Rmn. 
If one of the players makes its move first which means, for instance, that the seller makes its 
decision on volumes of the commodities to be manufactured in the free zone first by choosing the 
numbers (yrr,. . . , y,,&, so that the buyer can choose the numbers (zr , . . . , cc,) to satisfy (l)-(5), 
then the problem of finding the sellers’s optimal strategy is a max-min problem 
where (2, y) E S. If each of the players makes its move, being unaware in advance of what move 
is chosen by its opponent, then an equilibrium point (z*, y’) E S in the 2-person game for which 
cp2 (2*, Y) I 92 b*, Y*) 5 92 cGv*> 9 tJb*,Y)ES, \J hY*)ES 
is expedient to search. 
To simplify the consideration, it was assumed in the above that the seller is the only investor 
in the commodities manufacturing in the free zone. Otherwise, the seller may reimburse the 
expenses of the other investors participating in the deal, for instance, by sharing with them its 
profit (or revenue) or providing them stipulated volumes of some (or all) of the manufacturing 
(in the free zone) commodities. It is easy to show that in the latter case the structure of the 
payoff function remains the same, whereas the corresponding arrangements affect elements of, in 
particular, the vectors p and d. Certainly, the relations between the seller and the investors may 
be more complicated than just described. However, the analysis of such relations goes far beyond 
the subject of this paper. 
Typically, (1) has a more complicated form, but in the situations that are of interest from 
practical viewpoint, one can assume that z E MS c III, = {g 5 z 5 z}, where M, is a 
polyhedron. It is also assumed, that system (l)-(5) is compatible, otherwise corrections of right- 
hand sides of the system can be done to secure the compatibility using the linear programming 
based method proposed by the author and described, in particular, in [2]. 
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Hence, the formulated problems lead to analysis of the three mathematical problems of finding 
the following pairs of vectors. 
PROBLEM 1. 
(x*9 y*) E ($-& cp(x9y). 
PROBLEM 2. 
(x8*, Y**) E ( Axs mpyycph y>. 
I, 
PROBLEM 3. 
(x***, y***) E ( $zs my$ncp(x,y), 
I, 
where 
S={(z,y)2O:Az+By2d}, 
cp(x, Y) = (P, 4 + (x1 DY) + (Q, Y), 
Arg mEmpmcp(x,y) = (x**,y**) E S: (~(x**,y**) 
@.U)ES 
= min m= 
s:(z,l/z)ES y:(r,y)ES 
cp(x, Y), yx E -%%g 9(x, Y), (x,~) E S , 
: , 1 
Arg max min(o(x, y) = 
@X/KS y 
(x***, y***) E S : cp (x***, y***) 
= max min 
l/:b,,dES 2:(w)ES 
cp(x,~), xy E Argmin cp(x, Y), (x, Y) E S , 
z:(s,y)ES 
D f 0, and S is a polyhedron. However, in this paper, we study a certain generalization of the 
above three problems assuming that S is generally unbounded. 
3. BASIC RESULTS 
In this section, our attention is limited to considering the above three problems on an arbitrary 
set of pairs S = {(x, y) : z E R;, y E RT, Ax + By = cl}. It is obvious that various 2-person 
games can be formulated for analysis of the described above situation depending on the approach 
exercised for its mathematical modelling, as well as on organizational and economic requirements 
that affect the model to be chosen in the framework of the approach. The above three problems 
considered on S = {(x, y) : x E R3, y E RI;, Ax -I- By = d} being a particular case of the initial 
ones are, nevertheless, of independent interest for various applications including one described 
in the above for which an appropriate mathematical model with linear constraints of the form 
m S={(X,~):XER;,~ER+, Az+By = d} may be more natural to use under the corresponding 
economic and organizational reasons. 
We start our consideration with Problem 1. 
LEMMA 1. For (x*, y*) E Ep (t,y)E~~(x, y) it is necessary and sufficient that (x*, y’) be a saddle 
point of cp(x, y) on M(u*) = {x 2 0 : Ax = u*} x {y 2 0 : By = v’} = a(~*), cp(x*, y) 5 
(p(x*,y*) 5 cp(x,y*) Vx E M(v*), Vy E n(v*), for some ~*,21* such that u’ + v* = d. 
PROOF. Let (x*,y*) E S be an equilibrium point for cp(x, y) on S. It means that V(x*, y) E S 
and V (x, y*) E S we have (p(x*, y) 5 (p(x*, y*) 5 cp(x, y*). Denote AZ* = u* and By* = z1*, and 
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consider M(u*) = M(Ax*) and a(~*) = R(By*). Obviously, (~(x*,y*) 5 cp(x, y*) Vx E M(u*) 
because Ax = Ax* and Ax+By* = d Vx E M(u*), so that (x, y*) E S Vx E M(u*). Analogously, 
cp(x*, y) 5 (p(x*,y*) Vy E a(~*), so (x*,y*) is a saddle point for cp(x,y) on M(u*) x a(~*). 
If now (2*, y*) E M(u*) X n(v*) is a saddle point for cp(x, y) on M(u*) x a(~*), where U* + 
v* = d, then u* = Ax’ and v* = By’, and from Ax + By* = d, we have Ax = d - By* = u* 
t/(x, y*) E S so x E M(u*) and (p(x*, y*) I cp(x, y*) t/(x, y*) E S. Analogously, we have 
9(x*, y) 5 (p(x*, y*) V(x*,y) E S, so (x*, y*) is an equilibrium point for cp(x,y) on S. Lemma 1 
is proved. 
Let 
ii= _; ) 
[ 1 
E= _; ) 
[ 1 
z= (_:I), E= (_;I), 
so that M(u*) = {x 2 0 : ?i;c 2 i}, n(v*) = {y L 0 : Ey > q. 
LEMMA 2. (x*, y*) is a saddle point for cp(x, y) on M(u*) xCl(v*), p(x*, y) I (p(x*, y*) L cp(x, y*) 
Vx E M(u*), Vy E n(v*), forsomeu*,v* : IL+ + v* = d, if and only if there exist vectors z*, t* > 0 
such that the quadruple (x*, y*, z*, t*) 2 0 is a solution to the system 
( > b +(Ctt)+(Q,Y)-b,x)=O, (6) 
zXIp+Dy, Gy 2 E, (7) 
t& -q-xD, .,7X>% (8) 
PROOF. Necessity. Let (x*, y*) be a saddle point for cp(x, y) on M(u*) x n(v*), where v* +u* = d 
and cp(x*,y) 5 (p(x*,y*) 5 cp(x,y*) Vx E M(u*), Vy E R(v*). As shown in [2], it is then 
necessary that there exist vectors z* 2 0, t' 2 0, so that the pairs (E*, y’), (t*, x*) are solutions 
to the dual pair of linear programming problems 
and 
l-6 t> + b, 4 - min 
(t, 2)EP(u*)={(t,z)lO:t~<-q_zD, &>$}’ (10) 
so that (&z*) + (q, y*) = (-E, t’) + (p, x*) [3]. 
As (z*,y*) E WV*), (t”, x*) E P(u*), we conclude that the quadruple (x*, y*, z*, t*) 2 0 is a 
solution to (6)-(B). 
Suficiency. Let (x*, y*, z*, t') 2 0 be a solution to (6)-(B) for some u*, v* : u* + v* = d. 
It means that (z*, y*) E Q(v*), (t*, x*) E P(u*), so inequalities (7),(B) have feasible solutions 
and those solut$s being considered ones for dual pair of linear programming problems (9),(10) 
should satisfy (b, z*) + (q, y*) I (47, t*) + (p, x’). As it is well known [3] the equality in this 
inequality is attained if and only if (z*, y’) and (t*, x*) are optimal solutions to the above pair 
of linear programming problems (9),(10) which means (as shown in [2]) that (x’, y*) is a saddle 
point for cp(x, y) on M(u*) x n(v*), cp(x*, y) 5 p(x*, y*) I cp(x,y*) Vx E M(zl*), Vy E n(v*). 
Lemma 2 is proved. 
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Denote 
T= 
- -EW, 
E Wl 
0 Wl 
0 Wl 
E 
-iI, 
0 Wl 
- ow, 
E wa 
-Ewa 
0 w2 
0 w2 
-J%, 
E w2 
0 w2 
0 w2 
0 W 
0 W.9 
-EWQ 
E w3 
E 
-iI, 
0 W3 
0 w3 
0 w4 A 0, Oz, Oz, Ot, Ot, 
0 w4 -A 0, Oz, Oz, Ot, Ot, 
E w4 0, B Oz, O,, Ot, Ot, 
-Ew, 0, -B Oz, O,, Ot, Ot, 
-%4 0% 0, O,, O,, Ot, Ot, 
E w4 0, 0, Oz, O,, Ot, Ot, 
0 w4 0, D -AT AT Ot, 0t2 
0 w4 -DT 0, 0,, O,, -BT BT 
- 0 ow, ow, au, 0, 0, a, oz, a, a, w, 
0 alI, ow, ow, 0, 0, o,, a, a, a, w 
0 Ow, Ow, Ow, 0, 0, O,, O,, Et, -Et, WI 
0 Ow, Ow, Ow, 0, 0, O,, Oz, -Et, Et, W 
0 ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, a, a, a, a, 
H= w= 
0 ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, a, o,, a, a, w1 
-i:, E -Ew, Ew, Ow, Ow, 0, 0, 6, a 022 a, ot, a, Ot, a, 
0 ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, o,, oz, a, Ot, w1 
- 0 w1 ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, a, 02, a, a, 
z = (.q,zz) L 0, t = h,t2) L 0, 
h(w;,fJ&w;,w;) = (W;,Wa,W~,W~,2,Y,Zl,ZZ,tl,t2) 2 0, 
P = (0, 0, 0, 0, -P, Q, 0, 0, 0, 0) , 6 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 4 -4 -P, Q) , 
u* =w; -w;, v* =w; -w;, w; 2 0, w; 2 0, w; 20, 4 2 0, 
where matrices of the kind 0~ are quadratic with all elements equal to zero, Ep are unit matrices 
of corresponding dimensions. 
The following lemma is obvious. 
LEMMA 3. For any u*,v* such that u* + v* = d the quadruple (x*, y*, z*, t*) > 0 is a solution 
to (S)-(8) if and only if the vector 
h* =(W;,w~,W~,W;,x*,y*,Z;,E2+,t;,t;) LO 
is a solution to the system 
T.h(w;,w;,w;,w:) 2 6, (11) 
(h(w;,wf,w;,w;), Hh(w;,w;,w:,w;)) + (P, h(w;,w;,w:,w;)) = 0, (12) 
fo~~yut~~O,w~~O,w~~O,w~~O,satisfyingu*=wf-w~,v*=w~-w~. 
THEOREM 1. (x*, y*) E Ep(s,y)E~~(xr y) if and only if there exist wf L 0, wi 2 0, Ws 2 0, 
w; 2 0, zr 2 0, Z; 1 0, t; 2 0, t; 2 0, which along with x*, y*, form a solution to the system 
Th 2 6, 
(h, Hh) + (P, h) = 0, 
(13) 
(14) 
where h = (wl,w2,ws,wr,x,y,zl,q,tl,ta) 10. 
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PROOF. Necessity. Let (x*, y*) E Ep(z,r,)Es~(~,y). Then by virtue of Lemma 1, (z*, y*) is 
a saddle point for cp(z,y) on M(u*) x R(v*), cp(z*,y) 5 (p(z*,y*) I cp(z,y*) Vx E M(u*), 
V y E a(~*), for some u*,21* : u* + y* = d. According to Lemma 2, it means that there exist 
z*, t* 2 0 such that (z*, y*, z*, t*) 2 0 is a solution to (6)-(8), and taking into account the above 
notations and Lemma 3, we conclude that, for any UJ; 2 0, w; L 0, ~0: 2 0, wq* 2 0 satisfying 
u* =‘Wf 1 - w* v* = w* - w* the vector 27 3 47 
h* =(w;,w;,w;,wq*,x*,y*,~;,t;,t;,t;) LO 
is a solution to (13),(14). 
Suficiency. Let 
h* =(w;,w;,w~,wq*,x*,y*,~;,z~,t;,t;) LO 
be a solution to (13),(14). Then in virtue of Lemma 3 and Lemma 2, (x’, y*) is a saddle point for 
cp(x, y) on M(u*) x n(v*), cp(x*,y> 5 (p(z*, y*) I CP(Z,Y*) Vx E M(u*), VY E n(v*), where u* = 
W; -IV;, V* = W; -w& and u* +v* = d. Then, in view of Lemma 1, (x*, y*) E Ep (z,lI~E~~(~, y). 
Theorem 1 is proved. 
We now proceed to Problem 2. 
Throughout consideration of Problem 2, we assume that the following assumption holds. 
BASIC ASSUMPTION 1. For any x such that (x, y) E S the quantity maxy:(r,y)eS ~(x, y) exists. 
LEMMA 4. If 
(x**, Y**) E ( A,TFs m> my”” cp(x, Y>, 
I, 
then 
(x**, y**> E Arg 
(z,y)EM(u**)xR(v**) 
mjn myax 4x, Y), 
for u** = Ax** and v** = By’*, where M(u**) = {x 2 0 : Ax = u**}, fi(v**) 
v**}. 
PROOF. Consider the function c : M(u**) -+ R’, I(x) = ma+,eo(v=*) cp(x, y). 
defined on M(u**) because 
= {y > 0: By = 
This function in 
Cl (v**) = {y 2 0 : By = v**} = {y 10 : By = By**} = {y 2 0 : By = d - Ax**} 
={y->O:By=d- u**} = {y 2 0 : By = d - Ax, x E M (u**)} 
= {y 2 0 : Ax + By = d, x E M (u**)} 
={yL0:(x,y)ES,xEM(u**)}, 
SO that c(x) = max,en(v**) cp(x, y) = ma+(z,y)Es cp(x, y) = cp(x, yz), therewith the latter max- 
imum exists and the latter equality holds, in particular, for any (x, yz) such that x E M(u**) 
and yz E Argmax.r,:(,,,),scp(x, y) by the assumption of the lemma. As minz:(z,Y5)Es 9(x, yz) is 
attained at (x**, y”), we obtain that 
cp (x**, y**) = min z.(z,y,)eS v(xyyJ = IEM(u*m)i.& y )es YJ(x, ys) 9 I 
= BEg;fea) E(x) = min mm cp(x,yv), 
ZEM(U”) I/Ef2(tP’) 
which means that the quantity min,eM(u..) rn~en(v..) cp(x, y) exists and 
(x**, y**> E Arg 
Lemma 4 is proved. 
Let 
w(d) = {(u, v) : u + v = d, u = Ax, v = By for some (x, y) E S}, 
so that w(d) is nonempty for the nonempty S. 
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LEMMA 5. If the quantity 
min max 4X, y), z&f(u) yER(tJ) 
exists for any (u, w) E w(d), and 
(u**, ?I**, x**, y”) E Arg min rnin mya” cp(X, y) 
((u,u),s,v)E{(u,v)Ew(d)}xM(u)xR(v) (‘JJ’) 
={L > { Q i.7 2 5) E {(u,v) E w(d)} x M(u) x R(v) : p (2, j7) = cp (ZGG, yea) 
= (u $g(d) (P(xuv, YUVL (GIV, Yuv) E As mjn mu= cp(x, 9) , 
(w)EWu) x O(v) 
for some vectors u** and v**, then 
PROOF. 
1. We show first that from the assumptions of the lemma, we have 
Arg 
(Z,%J)ES 
rnjn mUa cp(X, y) # 0. 
To this end we notice that the equality 
= dx, Y,) : (TY) E S, yx E Argm= Y&Y) = H, 
l/:(w)ES 
holds as in virtue of the equality R(Zlk) = {y 2 0 : (X, y) E S, x E kf(uk)} the inclusion Q c H 
holds, whereas for any (X0, yzo) E S we have Ax0 = u,o , By,o = I+,,~, so that {y : (x0, y) E 
S} = (y 2 0 : By = d - Ax0 = d - U,O = By%0 = v~,~} = 52(~,~~) and mBXy:(xO,y)ES (p(xO,y) = 
mBXyEn(%zo ) (P(X’,Y), so that yxo E ArgmaxyEn(v, o) (p(X’, y) which means that X0 E M(u,o), 
yxo E fl(v,,,) such that (u,o, wyEo ) E d, and conseqiently, the inclusion H C Q also holds. We 
also notice that H # PI, in particular, by Basic Assumption 1. 
If there exists a sequence {Xk} for which p(Xk, yz,) -+ -oo as k + 00, then for some XkO, we 
have 
where yxko E Argmaxy:( x,o,y)E#,0(2k0,Y), SO for UkO = AXko and ?,kO = By,,,, We have (u,$,?&O) 
E w(d) and in virtue of the lemma assumption 
min max 
xEWu,o 1 Ya-e,O) 
9(X, y) 5 9 (xkwxko) < cP*, 
which contradicts the definition of cp*. 
As R1 2 H # QJ, and H is bounded from below, the quantity inf H = a E R’ exists. 
If cp(X, y,) > a, for any X such that (x, y) E S, then there exists a sequence {Xk} such that 
Cp(Xk, yzk) + a as k + 00 and the inequality a < cp* holds, because otherwise, we have cp(x, yz) > 
a 2 cp’ for any X such that (X, y) E S, which contradicts the equality (P(X**, y**) = cp*. However, 
Since ‘p* > a and Cp(Xk,yzk) + a as k --+ 00, we have that for some koo the inequality cp* > 
s3(@z):fi .s3(=R’s):(*.n)Jv31 
(ci‘x)dl xmu Up_U = (fi‘zpl XmU . 
(..fi)U3fl ‘493” 
= (**fi ‘**z) cfl 
SV 
(..~)ux(*.n)t\r3(~‘~) 
j/i ‘x)h x&u &I W 3 (**fi ‘**Xl 
dw ur”uI bm~)ux(oo”)Y\13w) 
‘(fi‘x)d, . SJV 3 (oofi ‘Ilox) 
aAvy ahi 
‘p wuura? 30 anl.rpi u! ‘pq? a3gou puo &g = eon ‘Ooxv = OOn ‘**fig = **n ‘**xv = _n alaqhi 
‘ { I# = fig : 0 7. “} = (,,g u ‘ {p = xv : 0 7 x} = (()(p) I4 
‘ {**a = fig : 0 7 fi} = (**a) 7s ‘ {**n = “V : 0 7 2) = (**n) A! 
lap!suo3 *(fi ‘x)d, Rxw_u zu!~ S3(R‘%t~V 3 (Ji ‘OOx) wqq MOU aurnssy *z 
X$durauou s! (6 ‘x)d, %w_u %!UI S3(A’sk?~V kjas ayl yc3y1 os szjs!xa (% ‘x)h ~3(2R‘~)%~~ ‘a3uaH 
*&I JO uoggap ay? s~~!pw~uo:, q3!qM 
upqqo a& ‘uoyduuwe suu.ua~ 
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LEMMA 6. For (u**,v**) E w(d) and z** E M(u**), y** E n(v**) the inclusion 
(z**, y**) E Arg 
(z,y)EM(u”)xo(v”) 
mF my8” cp(z, 51) 
holds, if and only if there exists a vector t** 2 0 such that (t**,x**) is a solution to the linear 
programming problem 
(-24) + (p,x) - min 
(kc)EP(u**) (15) 
and 
(4, t**) + (p, z**) = ‘p (2**, y**> 
holds, where P(u**) = {(t,z) 2 0 : tg 5 -q - zD, & 2 i}. 
PROOF. Necessity. Let 
(16) 
It means, in particular, 
(x**, y**) E Arg 
(x,1/)EM(u**)xn(v**) 
mF yw(x, Y). 
that the function 
is defined for all z E M(u**), so by the duality theorem of linear programming, the function 
t>O.t$$nq_zD { (-2, t> + (P, 4 1 
-’ - 
is also defined for all x E M(u**), in particular, for z**. 
Let 
_min 
t>O:tB<-q-s--D 
{ (-2, t) + (p, z**)} = (-t, t**) + (p, ST**) . 
Then, the linear function (-2, t) + (p,z) is bounded on P(u**) from below by the number 
(-E, t**) + (p,x**), because if for some (too, O” 5 ) E P(u**), we have (-g, too) + (p, zoo) < 
(-2, t**) + (p, z**), then 
min 
t>O:t&-q-x”OD 
{ (-2, t) + (p, zoo>> I (-2, too) + (p, x0”) < (4, t**) + (p, x8*) ( 
and consequently, 
arE%z’) cp cx OO,Y) < YEr$$*) (P(x**,Y) = sE$;**) Ve;$*, cp(X>Y) = (P(x**,Y**), 
where zoo E M(u**) (as for any (t,z) E P(u**), we have z E M(u**)), which contradicts the 
definition of (p(x**, y**). 
Hence, (-& t) + (p, ) * b z is ounded from below on P(u**) by the number (-2, t**) + (p, z**) so 
the function (-E, t) + (p, z) attains its minimum on P(u**) at (t**, z**) as (t**, x**) E P(u**), 
which means that (t**, x**) is a solution to linear programming problem (15). As 
min ma ZEM(U”) @l(v**) CP(G Y) = cp (x**, Y**) = yEzgw) cp b**, Y> 
= min 
t>O:tik-q-z*‘D 
{ (-2, t) + (p, 2**)} = (-2, t**) + (p, z**j ( 
- 
we conclude that (16) holds. 
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Suficiency. Let 
(t,zly$U**, {(-&t> + (W)} = {(-Et**> + (P&r**)} = (P(z**,Y**), 
for some u**, v** such that (u**,v**) E w(d), x** E M(u**), and y** E C!(TJ**). 
As by Basic Assumption 1, the set Pzoo(~**) = {(t,zoO) > 0 : tk 5 -q - xooD} c P(u**) 
is a nonempty polyhedral subset of the polyhedral set P(u**) for any zoo E M(u**), the lin- 
ear function (-E, t) + (p, z) attains its minimum on Pzoo(~**) (21, so that the function e(z) = 
min,,,,g~_,_,o((-E, t) + (P, 4) is e ne on M(u**), and in particular, for x** E M(u**). d fi d 
It is obvious that ((2) = min,,o,,~,_,_zn{(-& t) + (p, z)} 2 (-g, t**) + (p, cc**) for any 
cz E M(u**), as minimum of the linear function (-2, t) + (p, ST) on any nonempty polyhedral 
subset of the set P(u**) cannot exceed its minimum on P(u**). At the same time, the linear 
function (3, t) + (p, z**) being bounded from below on P(u**), and consequently, on P,.. (u**) by 
the number (-E, t**) + (p, x**) attains its minimum on P,- (u**) at the vector t** as (t**, CT**) E 
P,.. (u**). Hence, we have c(z) >_ (-E, t**) f 0, ,x**) for any CC E M(u**) and ~(cc**) = (-2, t**) + 
(p, z**), which means that min,EM(u.*) t(s) = <(z**) so that 
min min 
IEmU**) t>o:tE<-q-d 
{(-E,t) + (p,z)} = (-&t**) + (p,2**). 
As by the duality theorem of linear programming, the function 
&f& {h 4 + by DY) + k-h 9)) = tzO:t$~q_tD { (-5 t) + (P, 4) - 
is defined on M(u**), we obtain 
rE$;*‘) oE;&)7 UP* 4 + (G DY) + (q, Y)) 
= (-5 t**> + (P, 2**) = cp (Z**, Y**> = (t,z)m$U**J { (-5, t) + cp, x)} . 
Lemma 6 is proved. 
In addition to the above notations, we denote 
- 0 Wl O,, O,, O,, DT 0, BT -BT 
E W -So, Ew, -Ewq 0, 0, Ot, Ot, 
-Ku, Ew, -J&u, Ew4 0, 0, Ot, Ot, 
Tl = J%, --Go, O,, Ow, -A 0, Ot, Ot, 
-Ew, Ew, O,, O,, A 0, Ot, Ot, 
0 Wl Ow, Ku -Ewq 0, -B Ot, Ot, 
- 0 Wl O,, -Ew3 -‘So4 0, B Ot, Ot, 
hl (w;*,wf*,w~*,w;*) = (W;*,W;*,W;*,W;*,Z,y,tl,t2) 2 0, 
Pl = (0,0,0,0,P,0,0,0), 51 = (-q,d,--d,O,O,O,O), 
t = (t1,tz), u** = w;* - w;*, v** = wg* - w;+, 
and 
-0 Wl ow, ow, ow, a 0, a, ot, 
0 Wl ow, ow, ow, a 0, a, a, 
0 WI Ow, Ow, Ow, 0, 0, --Et, Etp 
0 Hl w1 Ow, Ow, Ow, 0, 0, Et, -Et, = 
0 W ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, a, ot, 
0 Wl ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, a, Ot, 
0 Wl ow, ow, ow, a 0, a, a, 
-0 WI ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, ot, Ot, 
The following result is obvious. 
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LEMMA 7. For any (u**, 21**) E w(d), the pair of vectors (t**,x**) is a solution to linear pro- 
gramming problem (15), if and only if the vector 
h;* = (w;*, wyt*, w;*, w;*, x**, y, t;‘, t;‘) 
is a solution to the linear programming problem 
TIhl (w;*, w;*, w;*, wq**) I 61, (17) 
(hl (w;*,w;*&*, 4 w**) ,HIhl (w;*, w;*, w;*, w;*))+(pl, hl (to;*, w~*,w~*,wi*))--+ min,(W 
for any wT*, w$*, wz*, wz* 2 0, satisfying u** = wT* - wz*, v** = wi’ - wq** and any y E Cl(v’*). 
In view of the above notations, the following relations hold 
K1 = {hI > 0 : TIhl 5 &} = {( WI, w2,203,204,2, y, t) 2 0 : tE 5 -q - 39, Ax 2 ii(Wl, WQ), 
g;yL :(w3,wq),w~-w2=~,w3-w4=v,~+v=d > 
and 
where 
(hlHlh1) + (pl, hl) = (--E(w3, w4), t) + (JI, x) , 
hl = (WI, w2, ~39~4, x, Y, 4 L 0, i$w1,w2)= (;;-), 3w3,w4)= (73, 
and t = (tl,tz) 2 0. 
THEOREM 2. 
(z**,Y**) E ( Axs *mv=cp(cy), 
I, 
ifand only if there exist vectors w;* 2 0, ~5’ 2 0, w$* > 0, w:’ 10, ti* 10, tz* L 0, such that, 
along with the vectors x8*, y** they form a solution to 
where h = (w1,w2,w3,w4,x,y,tl,~2) L 0 and 
,I~I~~<~, (h,i%h) + (m,hd = (~(x**,y**) 
holds. 
PROOF. Necessity. Let 
(x8*,9**) E ( Jbs m)mv=cphv). 
z, 
Then, by Lemma 4, there exist vectors u** and v**, such that u** + vu** = d and 
(x1*, y”) E Arg 
(z,y)EM(u**)xn(v”) 
m~yw(x, Y). 
As (‘II**, v**) E w(d), according to Lemma 6, we have that there exists a vector t** = 
(ti’, t;l*) 1 0 such that the pair of vectors (t**, x**) is a solution to (15) and (16) holds. Consider 
now the vector 
hi’ = (w;‘, w;*, w:*, w;*, x**, y**, t;‘, t;‘) > 0, 
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where u** = w:* - w$*, v** = w:* - w:*. This vector is a solution to (17),( 18) according to 
Lemma 7 as (15) holds, so that hi* E K1. 
We notice that the function (hl,Hlhl) + (pl, hl) * is b ounded from below on Ki by the number 
(P(z**,Y**), because otherwise, there exists the vector xi = ('W^I,~~,G~,G~,~,~,~) E Kl such 
that (xi, Hi&) < (p(z**, y**) so that (-z( h ws,&Q,r) + (p,Z?) < (p(z**,y**). Considering the 
linear programming problem 
(-2 (63,644) , t) + (P, 2) + min 
t/o:tn+q-3L)’ 
we conclude that as the set {t 2 0 : tE < -q - PD} is nonempty, the function (-$G3,G4),t) + 
(p, Z?) either attains its minimum on {t 2 0 : tg 5 -q - 82) or unbounded from below on this 
set. In the first case, we have 
so that by the duality theorem of linear programming 
where $ = $3 - $4, which contradicts the definition of (p(z**,y**). In the second case, by the 
duality theorem of linear programming the set n(G) = {y 2 0 : &y 2 E(T&,&)} is empty that 
contradicts the system of inequalities Eiy^ 2 $63, $4) which holds as xi E Ki. 
Hence, (hl,Hlhl) + (pl, hl) L p(z**,y**) for any hl E KI. 
At the same time in virtue of (16), we have 
(h;*, HIhi*) = (-E(w;*, w;*) ) t**) + (p, 2**) = cp (2**, y**> ) 
which means that hT* is a solution to (19) and equality (20) holds. 
Suficiency. 
1. Let 
hi* = (wi*,w~*,w~*,wq**,Z**,y**,ti*,t;*) 2 0 
be a solution to (19) and (20) holds. In virtue of Lemma 7, the pair of vectors (t**, z**), where 
t** = (ti*, tg*) is a solution to (15) for u** = wT* -w;*, v** = wz* -wf*, where (u**,v**) E w(d), 
and (16) holds, so by Lemma 6, we obtain that 
(x**, y**) E Arg 
(r,ar)EM(u**)xn(v’*) 
rn: n$x cp(s, y). 
2. We now show, that for any (u O”, voo) E w(d), there exists a pair of vectors (zoo, yoo) for 
which 
(XOO, yOO) E Arg 
(s,y)EM(u00)xR(v~) 
mp mV= cp(z, Y). 
To this end, we notice first, that for any (U O”, voo) E w(d) there exist the vectors 2 1 0, c 2 0, 
r> 0 such that (w~“,w~o,w~o,w~o,~,~,~ E Kr, for any wp” I 0, pug0 2 0, wg” 2 0, wi” 2 0 
such that uoo = wp” - wg” and voo = wg” - wg”. From the definition of w(d), we have 
uoo + voo = d, 
{ 
y>o:5yIz(wp -wy)}#o, {x~o:izzlb(w~“-W~o)}#O, 
whereas, in virtue of Basic Assumption 1, we have that for any f E M(uoo) the linear program- 
ming problem 
(P, 2) + (5, DY) + (q, Y) + yer$=n&o, 
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is solvable so that by the duality theorem of linear programming, the system of linear inequalities 
&<-q-30, t 2 0, 
being considered as a system of constraints for the linear programming problem 
where 
which is dual to the above, one has a feasible solution (r, E) for any wT” 2 0, w:” > 0, w$O > 0, 
wi” > 0 such that zloo = wy” - ,wq” and zloo = wj” - ~40’. Then for any jj E {y 2 0 : By 2 
&P~} = R(P), we obtain that hr = (w?‘, w!j”, wi”, ~~~,?^,y^,~) E KI for any wy” 2 0, w!j” 2 0, 
wg” 2 0, wi” 2 0 such that uoo = WY’ - WI” and voo = wg” - wp”. 
Since hi* is a solution to (19), we obtain 
(hi*, Hlh;*) + (Pl, h;*) I (h,Hlhl) + (PI, hl) , wwE{hlLO:T~h~~6~}, 
so for any wys 2 0, w$je 2 0, ~300 2 0, 20:~ 2 0 such that WI” - 20:’ = uoo, w!’ - 2~40’ = uool and 
00 00 hr(w?‘,wz 7~3 7~4 O”, 2, y, t) E KI, we have 
(h (w~“,w~o,w~o,w~o,~,y,t) ,Hlhl (w:“,w;o,w;o,w;o,x,y,t)) 
+ (PI, hl (WY’, w;‘, w;‘, w;‘, 5, y, t)) L (h;‘, Hlh;*) + (pl, h;‘) , 
which means that the linear function 
being bounded from below on the polyhedral set 
Koo = (w:‘, w;‘, wp, w;‘, z, y, t) 2 0 : t8 5 -q - zD, ;iz 2 i (WY’, w;‘) , 
~y~c=(~~~,~~~),~~~-~;~=u~~,~~~-w~~=~~~,~~~+u~~=d cK1, 
> 
which is nonempty as ir E Koo, attains its minimum on Koo at some (too, zoo, y) for any y E 
R(uoo). Taking into account Lemma 7, we conclude that (too,zoO) is a solution to the linear 
programming problem 
(-2 (w;s, w40°) ’ 9 + by 4 - (t,s)EP(uOO)’ min 
so taking further into account that the linear function (-z(wz”, wi”), t) + (p, z) attains its min- 
imum on any nonempty polyhedral subset of the set P(uoo) [2], in particular, on P+(u~~) = 
{(t, zoo) 2 0 : tg < -q - zooD} c P(uoo) at the vector (too, zoo), from 
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we obtain that 
(4 (up, wiO) ( too) + (p, zoo> = cp (zoo, YOO) , 
for some yoo E R(voo). 
According to Lemma 6, it means that 
(XOO, yO0) E Arg 
(z,ar)EA4(uoo)xn(voo) 
mp mgy cph Y). 
3. Let hy” = (w~~,w~~,w~~,uJ~~, x0’, yoo, too). As shown above, 
which means that 
cp (x8*, y**) = min min max CP(GY), 
(u,v)Ew(d) zEM(u) yER(v) 
as (u**, v**) E w(d), and by Lemma 5 
Theorem 2 is proved. 
The results formulated below are related to Problem 3. 
Similar to Basic Assumption 1 for Problem 2 in the above, we assume for Problem 3 that the 
following assumption holds. 
BASIC ASSUMPTION 2. For any y such that (x, y) E S the quantity minz:(z,y)ES cp(z, y) exists. 
LEMMA 8. If 
(x8**, y***) E Ax ma mjn 4x:, Y), 
(I,ar)EM(u***)xn(v***) y 
for @” = Ax*** md v*** = By***, where M(u***) = {x 2 0 : Ax = u***}, Q(v***) = {y 2 0 : 
By = v***}. 
Let r(d) = {(u, v) : u + v = d, u = Ax, v = By for some (x, y) E S} so that r(d) is nonempty 
for the nonempty S. 
LEMMA 9. If the quantity 
ma min CP(X,Y), 
l/En(w) zaf(u) 
exists for any (u, v) E r(d), and 
(u***, v***, x***, ,**y E Arg max max m;fn cp(x, y) 
((u,v),l,ar)E{(u,v)Er(d)}xM(u)xR(u) (w) y 
={ { 
(a, 0, ji, Q) E ((21, v) E Y(d)} X M(u) X O(v) : cp (3, g) = cp (xiiO, y-) 
for some vectors u*** and v***, then 
(x***, y***) E Ar g 
(W)ES 
cp(xt Y)* 
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Let 
for some u*** and v***, such that u*** + v*** = d so that 
M (u***) = {z 10 : Ax = u***} = {z 10 : jY, >‘;} , 
5-l (?I***) = {y 2 0 : By = v***} = {y 2 0 : zy 2 c} . 
LEMMA 10. For (u***,v***) E y(d) and z*** E M(u***), y*** E S~(TJ***) the inclusion 
(x***, y***> E Arg max m> CP(T Y) 
(z,ar)EM(u”‘)xn(v***) 9 
holds, if and only if there exists a vector z*** 2 0 such that (z***, y***) is a solution to the linear 
programming problem 
( > X1 z + (Q, y) - (z,V)~*$&*.) (21) 
and 
( > i;, z*** + (q, ,***) = cp tx***, ,***I (22) 
holds, where Q(v***) = {(z, y) 2 0 : .zA L p + Dy, gy > E}. 
In addition to the above notations, we denote 
- 0 Wl O,, O,, O,, 0, -D AT -AT 
E -E,, E,, -Euu 0, 0, Oz, 0,s 
-ii, E,, -E,, E,, 0, 0, Oz, Oz, 
T2 = O,, O,, E,, -E,, 0, -B O,, Oz, 
0 W 0,s -Gus Eu, 0, B Oz, Oz, 
E W -J% Ow, Ow, -A 0, Oz, Oz, 
--J%, Ew, O,, O,, A 0, Oz, O,, 
1 
and 
*** *** ha (w;**, ~2 , ‘wg , w;**) = (w;**, w;**, w;**, w;**,x, y, Zl, z2) 2 0, 
p2 = (0, 0, 0, o,o, Q, 0, 01, 62 = (P, 4 -4 0, 0, 0, ‘3, z = (Zl,Z2), 
u 
*** = W;*’ _ w;**, V *+* = W;*f _ w;**, 
- 0 Wl ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, oz, Oz,’ 
0 Wl ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, a, oz, 
0 Wl ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, a, a, 
0 ow, 0,s ow, 0, 0, oz, oz, 
Hz= w1 
0 Wl ow, ow, ow, a! 0, a, 0% * 
0 Wl ow, ow, ow, 0, 0, a, a, 
E -Ew, Ow, Ow, 0, 0, Oz, Oz, 
_-;:I Ew, 0,s Ow, 0, 0, a, oz, _ 
LEMMA 11. For any (u***,v***) E -y(d), the pair of vectors (z***,y***) is a solution to linear 
programming problem (211, if and only if the vector 
*** h, = (w;**, w;**, w;**, w;**, x, y***, z;**, z;**) 
is a solution to the linear programming problem 
T2h2 (w;**, w;**, w;**, w;**) 5 6, (h2 (w;**, w;**, w;**, w;*+) , H2h2 (w;**, w;**, w;**, w;**)) 
+ (p2, h2 (w;**, w;**, wz**, 2~;“)) + max, 
for ~QT w;**,w$**, w;**,wf** 2 0, satisfying u*** = wT** - wl**, v*** = w;** - w;** and ~IIY 
z E M(U***). 
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THEOREM 3. 
(x*** ,y***> E ( %smua mjn cpbhv), 
5, 
ifand only if there exist vectors w;** 2 0, wz** L 0, w:** 2 0, wi** L 0, zT** L 0, z;** 2 0, 
su& that &ng with the vectors x8**, y*** they form a solution to 
where h2 = (wl,w2,w3,w4,~,Y,~1,~2) 2 0 ana' 
(23) 
holds. 
Lemmas 8-11 and Theorem 3, can be proved following the lines of the proofs of Lemmas 4-7 
and Theorem 2, respectively. 
To conclude consideration of Problem 2 and Problem 3, we remind that we assumed in the 
above, that Basic Assumption 1 and Basic Assumption 2 hold for those problems, respectively. If 
the set S is bounded, then these assumptions, obviously hold, whereas for the unbounded S such 
assumptions are natural to make as searching a minimum of the function maxy:(s,y)ES cp(z, y) 
and a maximum of the function min,,(,,,)Es cp(x, y) implies that the functions are defined on the 
sets where the search is done. 
We now show that both Basic Assumptions are verifiable and the verification can be done by 
solving some auxiliary bilinear programming problems. Below, we consider Problem 2 whereas, 
for Problem 3 we just formulate the corresponding result. 
ASSERTION 1. The quantity 
ma cp(z,y), r&,V)ES 
exists for all x 2 0, such that (x, y) E S if and only if the equality 
min 
(I,y,z)~O:As+By=d,zijT20 
{ -(% z) - (k, DTz)} = 0 (*) 
holds. 
PROOF. 1. Let (zoo, y) E S for some y, which means that the system of linear equations By = 
d - Axoo is compatible. As the linear programming problem cp(soo, y) --t m~v~O:~~=&A~OO 
can be rewritten (using the above notations) in the form 
(P, xoo> + (xoo, DY) + (q, Y) - 
~~O:~~&& 
where 
we obtain that for its dual linear programming problem the set of feasible solutions is given by 
the system of linear inequalities 
In virtue of the duality theorem of linear programming [3], the initial linear programming problem 
is solvable if and only if the latter system of linear inequalities is compatible. 
2. By Farkas’ Lemma [3,4], the system of linear inequalities 
t>O*tgGq--zooD -* - 
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is compatible if and only if the linear inequality 
-(q, z) - (2, DTZOO) 2 0, 
holds for any z 2 0, such that zgT 2 0 so 
z>o;~T>o { - (q, 4 - (z, DT200)} = 0. 
-. - 
As 
min 
(s,y,z)>O:Az+By=d, zi?T>o 
t-h4 - WT4) = (~~~sz,om~,o{-(4,~) - (z,DT~)}, 
_:z - 
we conclude that the system of linear inequalities 
t>O:t2i+q-zD 
is compatible for all z 2 0, such that (5, y) E S if and only if the equality (*) holds. Assertion 1 
is proved. 
Hence, verification of the Basic Assumption 1 can be done by solving the bilinear programming 
problem 
-(q, z) - (z, DTz) + min 
(z,y,z)/O:Az+By=d, ~5~20 * 
(**) 
If the value of this problem is equal zero, then Basic Assumption 1 holds. If while solving 
problem (**) one finds that 
- (q, zoo) - (DTzoo, zoo) < 0, 
for some zoo > 0, such that zooET 2 0 and z - O” > 0 such that (zoo, yoo) E S, then the sys- _
tern of linear inequalities t 2 0 : tB 5 -q - sooD is not compatible so that the quantity 
maXy:(zoo,y)ES cp(zoo, y) does not exists. 
ASSERTION 2. The quantity 
s:~$gs 4z,Y), 
exists for all y 2 0, such that (2, y) E S if and only if the equality 
holds. 
Proof of Assertion 2 is identical to that of Assertion 1, whereas verification of the latter equality 
leads to solving a bilinear programming problems similar to (**). 
As shown above, existence of equilibrium points in the P-person game on a polyhedral set of 
connected strategies and the players’ strategies in each of the considered in this section two-move 
games is equivalent to solvability of problems (13),( 14) and, respectively, (19), (20), and (23), 
(24) so for some traditional questions such as, for example, those related to the structure of 
the set of solutions for the considered problems the answers are the same as for their equivalent 
problems (finding solutions of nonlinear system (13),(14) or quadratic programming problems). 
As methods of quadratic programming are well known [4], we further discuss just problem 
(13),(14). For this problem the following finite method is proposed. 
1. The problems 
(h7 Hh) + (PV h) + h>Eg>a (25) 
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are solved by any method, in particular, one of those described in [4]. If the value of problem (25) 
is less than zero or the value of problem (26) is greater than zero, then problem (13),(14) has 
no feasible solutions. If one of the values is equal to zero, then &in or h,,,, for which (14) is 
satisfied, is a solution to problem (13),(14). 
2. If while solving problems (25) and (26), one finds that for some h,x E {h 1 0 : Th > 6) 
the inequalities (h, Hh) + (p,h) < 0 and (x, H&) + (p, z) > 0 hold, then a solution to (13),(14) is 
attained, in particular, on the segment [&,z] c {h > 0 : Th > 6). To find the solution, consider 
the quadratic equation (Ah + (1 - X)E, H(Ah + (1 - X)x)) + (p, A& + (1 - A)@ = 0 that has a 
solution A* E (0, l), as (h, Hh) + (p, h) is a continuous function, in particular, on the segment. 
Then X*h + (1 - X*)E is a solution to (13) ,( 14). 
4. SOLUTIONS FOR THE GAMES ON 
S = {(zq/) : x E Rn,,y E R$Ax+By 1 d} 
We now proceed to consideration of the above three problems on the set S = {(z,Y) : z E 
R3, y E R;T, AZ + By > d}. For Problem 1, we establish verifiable necessary and sufficient 
conditions of a Nash equilibrium point of the game similar to those established for the game 
considered in the preceding section. For Problem 2 and Problem 3, we show how the results 
developed for the two-move games on the set S = ((2, y) : 2 E R3, y E RI;, Az + By = d} can 
be employed for those, in the general case, under consideration in this section. 
Let 
if1 = {(x, (y, s)) 2 0 : Ax + By - s = d} , ~2={((z,~),y)>O:A~+By-s=d}, 
(pl (x7 (Y, 3)) = (P> 4 + (2, Dl(Y> s)) + b?? 01, (Y, 4) 7 
$92 (b-h s), Y> = (ho)7 (x7 s)) + ((x9 SL D2Y) + (4, YL 
where 
D 
, Dz= ..a , 
[ 1 0, 
and 0, is a zerematrix, whereas 0 is a zero-vector of corresponding dimensions, respectively. 
We start our consideration with Problem 1. 
LEMMA 12. 
if and only if the inclusions 
(z*,Y*) E ( EPs CpbGY), 
2, 
(x*7 cy*, s*)> E ( p_* ‘pl (x7 (Y9 3)) 
2, 78 
and 
((Z’,S’),Y’> E ((5 Q& cp2 (bc, sh Y) 7 
, 9 
hold for the vector s* 2 0 such that Ax* + By* - d = s*, where 
( fvEyl,s cplb, (Y,s)) = { (x*3 (Y *r s*)) : cpl lx*, (Y, s)) 5 cpl (x*9 (Y',S')) 
5, ,s 1 
5 $9 (2, (Y",S')> 1 (x*9 (Y, s)) E Is;, (x, (Y', s*)) E g1 > 
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and 
,,zsEt))ES^ cpa((v),y) = w*ls*)7y*) : cp2((~*7s*)ly) I (P2((z*vs*),Y*) 
, 7 1 
I (P2 ((w%Y*)~(( x*7 s*), Y) E g22, ((2, s), Y*) E g2} . 
PROOF. Necessity. Let (x*, y*) E Eprp(r,y)Es. Then, we have 
cp(x*,Y) I (P(x*,Y*) I (P(x?Y*)> for any (x*, y) E 5’ and (x, y*) E S. 
Let further Ax* + By* - d = s* 2 0, and consider the pair (x*, (y*, s*)) E $ in which 
the last component is in its turn the pair (y’, s*). For the function cpi(x, (y, s)), we then have 
$3(x*, (YI 9)) I (P1(x*, (Y*, s*)) for any (x*,(y,s)) E Si, because (x*,y) E S for any (x*(y,s)) E 
&, (x*,y*) E S and 
cpl (x*, (y, s)) = cp (x*7 Y) I cp (x*3 Y*) = $9 (x*7 (Y*, s*)) 7 
as the inequality cp(x*,y) I (p(x*, y*) holds, for any (x8, y) E S. 
We also have (pr(x*, (y*, s*)) I cpi(x, (y’, s*)) for any (x, (Y*, s*)) E gl, became (z, Y*) E S 
for any (x, (y*, s*)) E Sr, (x*,y*) E S, and 
cpl (z*, (Y*, s*)) = cp (z*,Y*) I cp (&Y*) = (Pl (x7 (Y’9 s*>> 7 
a,~, the inequality (p(z*, y*) 5 cp(z, y’) holds, in particular, for any (x, y*) E S such that AZ + 
By* -d = s*. 
So, we have 
cpl (x*9 (Y, s)) I 91 (z*v (Y*, s*>> 
I cpl (T (Y*, s*)) 3 for any (z*, (3, s>> E &, lx, b*,s*)> E &, 
which means that (x*, (y*,s*)) E Ep(s,Cy,sJlegl cpi(x, (y,s)) for the vector s* 1 0 such that 
Ax*+By*-d=s*. 
The same scheme is applied to be certain that ((x*, s’), y’) E Ep (Cl,+J,YJes2 cps((x, s), y) holds, 
for the vector s* 2 0 such that Ax’ + By* - d = s*. 
Suficiency. Let the inclusions (x*, (y*, s*)) E Ep (z,Cy,sJJE~l cpr(x, (y, s)) and ((x’, s*), y*) E 
;h;;z,~1,YlE~2 (P~((x, s),Y) hold for th e vector s* 2 0 such that Ax’ + By* - d = s*. It means 
cpl (x*7 (Y, s>> I 91 (x*7 (Y*, s*>> 
I 91 (z, (Y*, St)) ? for my (x*,(y,s)) E &, (x,(Y*,~*)) E &, 
and 
$72 ((x*7 s*),Y) I $92 ((x*7 s*)vY*) 
I cp2((~,S)9Y’)7 for any ((x*.s*),y) E g2, ((x,s>,y*) E Z2. 
As (x8, (y”, so)) E $1 for any (x’, y”) E S and s o = Ax’ + By0 - d, and ((Z, Z), y’) E SZ for 
any (&y*) E S and Z= AZ?+ By* -d, (x*,y*) E S, as (x*,(y*,s*)) E Si and ((x*,s*),y*) E g2, 
from 
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cp (x*7 YO) = Pl (x*9 (YO, SO)) I Pl (x8, (Y*, s*)) = 9 (z*, y*) 
and 
(P(x*,Y*) = cp2 cc x*,s*LY*) I cpa((z^,%Y*) = cp(cY*), 
for any (x*, y”) E S and (2, y*) E S, respectively, we have 
(P(x:*, Y) 5 (Ph*,Y*) I cp(GY*) 7 for any (z*, y) E S, (CC:, y*) E S. 
It means that (z*, y*) E Ep(z,v)Es’p(z,y). Lemma 12 is proved. 
In addition to the above notations, we denote 
T’ = 
H’ = 
T2 = 
-Ew, Ewa 
E Wl -E,, 
0 ow, Wl 
0 ow, Wl 
E Wl -E,, 
-Ew, Ew, 
0 ow, Wl 
0 ow, Wl 
0 ow, Wl 
0 Wl 
0 Wl 
0 Wl 
0 Wl 
0 Wl 
0 Wl 
0 Wl 
E Wl 
-Ew, 
0 Wl 
0 Wl 
0 WZ 
0 W? 
0 W 
0 W? 
0 Wl 
0 WZ 
0 
-;I, 
E W2 
0 WZ 
0 W!2 
0 w3 
0 w3 
-Ew, 
E w3 
E w3 
-Ew, 
0 w3 
0 w3 
0 w3 
0 w.4 A 0, 0s 03, o,, o,, 
0 w4 -A 0, 0s 03, o,, o,, 
E w4 0% B -E, 03, O,, O,, 
-Ewq 0, -B Es 03, O,, O,, 
-Ew4 0, 0, 03 a, 03, o,, 
E w4 0, 0, 0s o,, o,, o,, 
0 w.4 0, D 0, -AT AT O,, 
0 w4 -DT 0, 0, O,, O,, -BT 
0 w-l 0, 0, 0s 03, O,, E,, 
0 w3 ow, 0, 0, 03 oz, a, a?, o,, 
0 W3 ow, a 0, 03 a, 03, a, o,, 
0 w3 ow, 0, 0, 03 Oz, 0,s E,, --Em 
0 w3 ow, 0, 0, 03 Oz, O,, -E,, E,, 
0 w3 Ow, a 0, 03 a, 03, o,, o,, 
0 w3 ow, 0, 0, 03 a, a, o,, o,, 
0 w3 all, 0, 0, 0, o,, a, o,, o,, 
0 W3 ow, 0, 0, 03 031 03, o,, o,, 
0 w3 ow, 0, 0, 03 03, 03, 077, o,, 
0 w3 all, 0, 0, 0s a, a, o,, o,, 
0 w3 au, 0, 0, 03 031 o,, o,, o,, 
-Ewl Ew, O,, Ow, A 0, -Es 0x1 
E W -&.,a O,, Ow, --A 0, E3 0x1 
0 w1 Ow, -Ew, Ew4 0, B 03 0x1 
0 W Ow, &3 -Ew, 0, -B 03 0x1 
E Wl --&,a &3 -Ew, 0, 0, 03 Ox, 
-Ewl Ew, -Ew3 Ew, 0, 0, 03 0x1 
0 W Ow, O,, O,, 0, D 0, -AT 
0 w1 0,s Ow, O,, -DT 0, 0, Ox1 
0 Wl Ow, Ou, Ow, 0, 0, 03 Exl 
a, ot, 
a, ot, 
ot, ot, 
ot, a, 
a, a, 
a, a, 
ot, ot, 
-BT BT 
Ot, Ot, 
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0 Wl a, aJ, ad, 0, 0, a ox, ox, ot, ot, 
0 Wl aa ow, a, a 0, 0, ox1 OA, ot, ot, 
0 w %, ou, ow 0, 0, 0, Ox, OA, Et, -Et, 
o WI ow ow, ow oz o, o, OxI OA, --Et, Et, 
o w old, ow, ou, 0, o, OS ox, oxa a, ot, 
H2 = ow, ou, ow, old, o, o, 0, ox, ox2 ot, ot, 
o w ou, 0% old, 0, o, OS ox, ox, ot, ot, 
E WI -Ew, ow, ow, oz o, 0, ox, ox, ot, ot, 
-EM Ewp ow, ou, oz o, o, ox, ox, ot, ot, 
o WI o*, ow, o,, oz o, o, ox, Oxa ot, ot, 
- 0 w Ow Ow, O,, 0, 0, 0, ox, Oxa ot, ot, 
p^= (0, 0, 0, 0, 9, q, 0, 0, 0, 0, O), g= (0, 0, 0, 0, d, -d, -p, q, 0). 
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Let T., . . . ,Ti and T’f, . . . , Tl be block matrices that are formed by blocks situated in the 
columns of the matrices T1 and T2 with numbers 1-4; 5-7; 8, 9 and 10, 11, respectively, so that 
T’ = [T; T; T; T;] , T= = [Tf T,2 T; T;] , 
and let H,‘,, . . . , H&, Hf,, . . . , H& be block matrices such that 
where the blocks in the rows of the block matrices H,‘,, . . . , Hi4 and HF,, . . . , Hf4; H,_&, . . . , H.j4 
and H&, . . . , H&; H&, . . . , H&, and Hi&, . . . , H&; HiI,. . . , H& and H$, . . . , H& are formed by 
the blocks situated in the rows of the matrices H1 and H2 with numbers l-4; 5-7; 8, 9 and 
10, 11, respectively, whereas the blocks in the columns of the block matrices HiI,. . . , Hi1 and 
H&, . . . , H&; Hf2,. . . , Hi2 and Ht2,. . . , Hi=; His,. . . , H& and H$, . . . , H&3; Hid,. . . , Hi4 and 
Hf&... , H& are formed by the blocks situated in the columns of the matrices H’ and H2 with 
numbers 1-4; 5-7; 8, 9 and 10, 11, respectively. 
Let further 
H,1, 0 Hi2 Hi3 Hf4 0 0 
000 0 0 00 
H;, 0 Hi2 Hi3 Hi4 0 0 
H& 0 Hi2 H& Hi4 0 0 
HiI 0 Hi2 H& Hi4 0 0 
000 0 0 00 
000 0 0 00 
0 0 0000 0 
0 H& H,2= 0 0 H& H& 
0 H;, Hz2 0 0 H& Hz4 
0 0 0000 0 
0 0 0000 0 
0 H& Hi2 0 0 H& H& 
o Hi1 Hi2 0 0 H& H& 
and 0 in a’, E2, and !?, and 0 in p and S are zeroblock matrices and zero-vectors of corre- 
sponding dimensions. 
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THEOREM 4. 
cz*, Y*) E (EJs cp(& YL 
jf ad only jf there exist wT 2 0, W; 2 0, W$ 2 0, wf 2 0, WT > 0, Wi 2 0, WZ 2 0, Wi 2 07 
s* 2 0, z; 2 0, g 2 0, r; 2 o, ~5 2 o, A; 2 o, A; L 0, t: > 0, tl 2 0, which along with x*, Y* 
form a solution to the system 
+% 2 & 
(%,EljE) + (FJL) = 0, 
(27) 
(L,ii211) + (n”h) = 0, 
where 
PROOF. Necessity. Let (z*, y’) E Ep (r,y)~~ cp(x, Y). Then bvi~ueofLemma129 cz*y (y*y s*)) E 
EP (z,(rm,aJJE~l 91(x, (Y, s)) and ((x’, s*), Y*) E EP ((z,s),ar)~& q2(@, s)t Y), where ‘* = Az*+ 
BY* _ d. According to Theorem 1, there exist wr L 0, $ 2 0, W3* 2 0, Wq* 2 oy zT 2 oy 
z; 2 0, ,r; 2 0, ,r; 2 0 that along with z*, y*, s* form a solution to the system 
T1hl > $ - 1 
(h’,H’h’) + (p? h’) = 0, 
(28) 
where h’ = (w~,~~,wQ,w~,z, Y, S,Z1,~2,7Fl,n2) L 0 and WT L 0, Wz* 2 0, “‘3f 2 ‘1 wq* 2 ‘7 A; 2 ‘1 
A; 2 0, t; 2 0, t; 2 o that along with x*, y*, s* form a solution to the system 
T2h2 > ; - 7 
(h2, H2h2) + (p^, h2) = 0, 
where h2 = (w1,w2,w3,w4,x,y,S,X1,X2,tl,t2) 2 0. 
Let 
“h’ =(W;,wrt,W~,W;,W;,W;,W3*,W~,x*,y*,S*,Z;,Z2*,1r;,~2*,X;,X;,t;,t;) 20. 
Then taking into account the above notations, we have 
[T;oT,‘T,‘T,‘oo]~* =T1hl* >s^ 
and 
[OTfT;OOT;Tj]“h* =T2h2* 2 ;, 
where 
and 
h2* = (w;,w;,w~,w~,x*,y*,s*,A;,A;,t;,t;) 20, 
are the solutions to systems (28) and (29), respectively. As 
(“h’,i%*) + (@) = (h’*, i+h’*) + (p? hl*) 
and 
(29) 
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from (hl*,H’h’* + ) (p? I$*) = (I?*, Hz!?*) + (p? I?*) = 0, we conclude that the vector ?I* is a 
solution to system (27). 
Suficiency. Let the vector 
be a solution to the system (27). Taking into account the above notations, we then have that the 
vectors 
hl* = (Wi,W;,W~,WqL,X*,y*,S*,Zi,Z2*,~1*,?Tzf) 2 0 
and 
h2* = (Wi,W~,W~,W~,X*,y*,S’,x;,xa,t;,t~) 2 0, 
are solutions to the systems (28) and (29), respectively. According to Theorem 1, it means that 
the vectors (z’, (y*, z*)) and_ (( x*, s*), y*) are equilibrium points for the functions cpr(x, (y, s)) 
and cp2((z, s), y) on Sr and Ss, respectively, and s* = AZ* + By” - d so by virtue of Lemma 12, 
we have (z*, y*) E Ep (s,y)Es cp(x, y). Theorem 4 is proved. 
Thus, it is shown that calculating equilibrium points of the function cp(x, y) on S = {(x, y) : 
x E R3, y E RT, AZ + By 2 d} is reducible to solving system (27). For solving such a system 
various methods, in particular, the one proposed in (51 can be employed. 
We now proceed to Problem 2 and Problem 3. 
Let Basic Assumption 1 and Basic Assumption 2 hold, respectively, for Problem 2 and Prob- 
lem 3 considered on the set S = ((x, y): x E RI;, y E RI; : Ax + By 2 d}. 
From 
for any x0 2 0 such that (x0, y) E S and 
min s:($jEs~ (2’ yO) = (I,s):((z 8) vo)Egz vJ2 (CX’ s)yO) =_g~& Pi 6 yO) ’ 9 9 
for any y” L 0 such that (2, y”) E S, where 
sz= {(Z,y)>o:&+By=d}, SC= {(x,y3 >O:Az+&=d}, 
A+-E). I?+-E), sL&, sLS2, z=(x,s), @=(y,s), 
the following results are straightforward. 
THEOREM 5. 
@**,Y**) E ( Av;~sm~my~rp(~,yL 
5, 
if and only if the three of vectors (z**, (y**,s**)), where AZ** + By** - d = s** 2 0 form a 
solution to the problem 
(x**, (y**, S**)) E Arg 
(4/,4)E~l 
mp;491 (xl (Y, s)). 
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THEOREM 6. 
(x***, y***) E ,$xs mgympcp(~,y), 
2, 
if and only if the three of vectors ((z***, s***), y***), where AZ*** + By*** - d = SC*** 2 0 form 
a solution to the problem 
((x***,~***),Y***) E Arg _ rn~~is;cps ((~,s),y). 
((W)~Y)ESZ 
Thus, Problem 2 and Problem 3 are reducible to those for the functions cpr(z, (y, s)) = cpr(s, 9 
on the set SC and cps((z, s), y) = cps(Z, y) on the set S”, respectively, and the latter problems are 
in their turn reducible to quadratic programming problems. 
As for verification of the both assumptions for the unbounded S, it can be done the same way 
described in the preceding section. 
5. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
1. For aught the author knows, the problem of finding equilibrium points in 2-person zero-sum 
games on a polyhedral set of connected strategies was for the first time stated by the author in [6]. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions of the equilibrium points in some 2-person games of the kind 
along with those for max-min and min-max points in the two-move games with the payoff function 
being a sum of two linear functions and a bilinear one were also for the first time announced 
there. Such conditions of the equilibrium points in the considered 2-person game presented in 
this article establish equivalence between calculating the game equilibrium points and solving 
nonlinear systems (27) or (13),(14) (for S = {(z, y) : x E RT, y E RT, Ax + By = d}) and for 
the latter problem it can be done by a finite method. The same kind equivalencies of the max- 
min and min-max problems for the considered payoff function to some quadratic programming 
problems were also established in this article. 
For some special kind of the problems with rather specific both the polyhedral set and the 
payoff function that formally belong to the examined games it is possible to stay within linear 
programming for calculating all the considered points [6]. H owever, the exercised approaches in 
such cases being fully based on the mentioned specifics are substantially different from those of 
used in the general case. 
2. Along with the proposed applications for the games considered in the present article there 
exist various others, in particular, in problems that generalize those presented by Danskin in [7]. 
For such generalizations that lead to the 2-person zero-sum game on a polyhedral set of connected 
strategies, finding a certain equilibrium should be considered as a reasonable approach to analysis 
of the appeared games, especially taking into account that the equilibrium points interpretation 
in various practical situation turns out to be very transparent. For those generalizations that 
lead to the two-move games the possibility to reduce their analysis to that of quadratic program- 
ming problems enables researches to deal effectively with large scale problems being typical for 
numerous applications. 
3. The results obtained should also be considered as a next successful attempt towards ex- 
tending capabilities of the standard optimization software, in particular, that of developed for 
quadratic programming problems, to be employed for solving substantially nonlinear large scale 
optimization problems with linear constraints arising in applications. Earlier the results of such 
kind were obtained by the author, in particular, in [8,9]. 
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